Traditionally the cost of expected inflation has been seen as the "shoeleather cost" of going to the bank more often. This paper focuses on the other side of these transactions--i.e., on the increased production of financial services by financial firms. I construct a model in which households must make purchases either with cash or with costly transactions services produced by firms in the financial services sector. One can think of these services as being the use of a credit card or other method of paying without cash. In the model, a higher inflation rate leads households to substitute purchased transactions services for money balances. As a result, the financial services sector gets larger. A test of the model using cross-sectionaldata finds that the size of a nation's financial sector is strongly affected by its inflation rate. The empirical results provide an alternative way to measure the costs of inflation. These costs appear to be large.
Introduction
Traditionally, the cost of expected inflation has been viewed primarily as the "shoeleather cost" of going to the bank more often, as in the familiar Baumol-Tobin parable (Baumol, 1952; Tobin, 1956) .
In this view, households reduce their average holdings of cash by making smaller withdrawals with greater frequency, and the cost of the inflation is the utility loss associated with trips to the bank, waiting in line, etc. This paper focuses on the banks' side of these transactions: in order to satisfy the increased customer activity, banks may need to hire additional tellers, build more and larger branches, or make other costly investments in automation or technology. Thus, the cost of inflation can be viewed, at least in part, as the result of resources transferred to the financial sector to accommodate the increased number of transactions chosen by households as they attempt to shift the cost of holding currency onto others. These resources are a social loss because if inflation were lower, the resources could be used directly to increase production of consumer goods.
This focus on the effects of inflation on the size of the financial sector is not new. Bresciani-Turroni , in his history of the German hyperinflation,notes that inflation caused a 'hypertrophy of the banking system~in late 1922 and 1923 (Bresciani-Turroni , 1937 . For example he reports that more than 400 new banks were established.in 1923, the peak year of the hyperinflation. This was more than four times the number established in 1922, and six times the number established in 1920 and 1921. At the same time, existing banks were extending their branch networks and greatly increasing their employment. There were 30,489 employees at the 'DV banks (Deutsche Bank, Diskonto-Gesellschaft , Darmstadter Bank, and Dresdner Bank) in 1920. By 1922 there were more than 45,000 employees, and by the fall of 1923, when the inflation was at its peak, almost 60,000.
Bresciani-Turroninotes that the increase in banking activity reflected a higher volume of financial transactions rather than an increase in real activity. Indeed, the number of current accounts at the three largest "D" banks rose from less than 1.5 million at the end of 1920 to an estimated 2.5 million at the end of 1923.
The rapid expansion in the banking sector generated by the In order to address this issue, I construct a model in which households can make purchases with cash or with purchased transactions services. A number of recent papers (e.g. Cole and Stockman, 1992; Schreft, 1992; Gillman, 1993; Dotsey and Ireland, 1993 ) present models in which households can transact without money at some cost in terms of labor. While these models allow for alternative methods of transacting, the focus on labor costs seems to capture primarily the cost of household "home production" of financial services. In contrast, the approach taken here is to allow agents to make purchases with "transactionsservices~supplied by banks or other financial firms as in Fischer (1983) , Prescott (1987) , and Aiyagari et al. (1995) . In the model, households are constrained to make purchases 1 either with cash or with purchased transactions services. One can think of these services as interest-bearingchecking accounts, money market mutual funds, overdraft services, or credit cards. An increase in the inflation rate induces households to substitute transactions services for real balances. As a result, increases in the inflation rate increase the size of the financial sector.
I test this implication of the model using cross-sectional data on financial sector size and inflation rates. The results suggest that the effect of inflation on the size of the financial sector is significant both economically and statistically. The empirical model indicates that the effect of a 10 percent inflation in the United States would be to increase the share of GDP produced in the financial sector by almost 1-1/2 percentage points. This estimate of the cost of inflation is larger than those found in earlier studies, such as those of Fischer (1981) and Lucas (1981) , although it is similar to that found in a recent study by Lucas (1994) .
I. The Model
The economy contains a continuum of identical agents, indexed by ic [O,l] , each with infinite horizons. Each period they supply a 1. One could also require firms to transact with cash or transactions services. This issue is discussed below. In practice, firms' purchases of cash management services are likely very important. At the end of the period, households receive their wage and a cash transfer from the government, and they pay for the purchases made with transactions services as well as for the services themselves.
Then they choose their money and capital holdings for the start of the next period, and the period ends.
The economy has three types of firms. Firms in the consumption goods sector produce one of a continuum of consumption goods. The market for each of the goods is competitive. Firms in the capital goods sector produce capital. Firms in the transactions services sector produce transactions services. As discussed below, capital and transactions services can be purchased without cash or transactions services. Firms in all three sectors are competitive, and production in each sector requires both capital and labor.
A. The Transactions Technology
There is a continuum of goods in the economy indexed by j, je [O,l] . Each good is assumed to be purchased with a separate transaction. Agents can pay cash, or incur a fixed cost, q, to make the purchase without cash. Because the cost of making a purchase 2. If labor supply were not inelastic, then inflation would affect labor supply. Since my focus here is on the effects of inflation on the size of the financial sector, I do not take account of this possible effect. See Aiyagari et al. (1995) for a related model that includes an effect of inflation on labor supply. without money is independent of the size of the transaction, agents will make small transactions with cash and large ones with transactions services. This approach is similar to that taken by Whitesell (1989 Whitesell ( , 1992 in studies of the optimal use of alternatives to cash purchases, although Whitesell (1992) allows for more than one alternative to cash and both a fixed and a proportional cost of transacting without cash.
Other recent models take a variety of approaches to get a margin along which agents adjust to reduce cash transactions in the face of higher inflation. In Gillman (1993) and Aiyagari et al. (1995) the cost of making a purchase without cash is assumed to be proportional to the size of the transaction, and the size of the cost differs exogenously across goods. In Schreft (1992) and Dotsey and Ireland (1993) , the cost is assumed to be larger for goods purchased farther from the agent's location on a unit circle.
The cost structure assumed here has the intuitively appealing implication that cash transactions tend to be smaller than check or credit purchases. Evidence on actual household transactions can be obtained from the preliminary results of the 1995 Survey of Consumer Transactions Accounts Usage, commissioned by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. This survey, conducted in May 1995, showed that the mean size of household check transactionswas $80, the mean size of credit card purchases was $54, and the mean size of debit card transactionswas $24. By contrast, the mean cash purchase was $11.
The pattern of transactions sizes is similar to the one prevailing in the mid-1980s, as reported by Whitesell (1992) . The 1995 survey showed that on average households used checks to make 15 purchases a month, credit cards to make 4 purchases, debit cards to make 1 "purchase, and cash to make 29 purchases. Thus, cash was used for nearly 60 percent of purchases, but those purchases accounted for less than 20 percent of the dollar volume of expenditures.
The nature of the cost of transacting without cash differs across the papers in this area. Gillman (1993) , Dotsey and Ireland (1993) , and Schreft (1992) all assume that the cost is a labor cost--perhaps focusing on the purchaser's nuisance costs of writing a check, keeping records, waiting while the store verifies the check, etc. By contrast, this paper, like Prescott (1987) and Aiyagari et al. (1995) , focuses on the production of transactions services by financial firms.
The model in Fischer (1983) allows for both household production of transactions services and purchases of transactions services from banks, with their marginal costs equalized in equilibrium. Whitesell In the model presented here agents pay a fixed cost for transaction services. In practice, of course, the purchaser generally does not actually pay the fixed cost of the transaction. While some banks do have per-check fees on some accounts, and some sellers have different prices for cash and credit purchases, these direct payments 3. The nuisance costs could even be negative, especially for large transactions, owing to the possibility that large amounts of cash could be lost or stolen. The assumption that the cost of transacting without cash is independent of transaction size may not be strictly true for very large transactions, but it seems more reasonable than the assumption that the cost is proportional to the transaction size. The cost of clearing a personal check through the payments system, for example, is likely the same virtually regardless of the amount of the purchase.
For example, the Federal Reserve System's functional cost analysis reports a fixed estimated cost for individual check transactions regardless of size (FederalReserve System, 1995) . The same should be true for credit card transactions. For retailers, the costs of verifying checks and credit card accounts as well as the subsequent paperwork should not depend on the size of the transaction (although retailers may be more likely to verify large transactions). As for purchasers, the nuisance costs of writing the check or waiting for the clerk to handle the transaction are likely very similar for widely different transaction sizes.
4. Of course, a higher credit price would amount to a proportional, rather than a fixed, cost of transacting without cash (see Aiyagari et al., 1995, p. 9) . 1 assume that capital goods can be purchased without cash at 5 no cost. Not doing so would generate an investment distortion as in Stockman (1981) . Aiyagari et al. (1995) assume that households augment their capital holdings by purchasing equal amounts of each consumption good. As a result, capital is purchased in part with cash and in part with transactions services. Purchases of capital are likely very large, however, compared to the average household purchase. For example, the average size of a check purchase, including purchases by businesses, is about $1150, while the average size for households, as noted above, is only $80 (Humphrey,et al., 1995) . Thus the assumption in Aiyagari et al. may greatly overestimate the cash portion of capital purchases. One could model purchases of capital in a manner similar to that used for consumption goods here--allowing the size distribution of capital goods purchases to differ from that for consumption goods. Implicitly, I am assuming that capital goods purchases are so large that they can be made without cash at negligible cost.
B. The Household's Problem
The representativehousehold gets utility in a given period based on consumption of the various consumption goods:
J is the consumption of good j, y is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,and~(j) is a weighting function. I assume that~(j) is increasing in j, and that~(l) is 5. I also assume that firms do not need to pay cash in advance for labor and capital services. 6 equal to 1.
I will also assume that~is continuous and strictly increasing in j.
Given my assumptions about~(j), and the fact that all goods have the same price in equilibrium, households will choose a cutoff * value of j, j , and purchase goods O through j* (i.e., those goods it consumes relatively little of) with cash. The remaining goods are purchased with transactions services, hence the household purchases
(1-j') units of transactions services.
Thus the household's maximization problem is:
l-y Subject to a budget constraint:
PP 'OJj P and two transactions constraints:
where w is the wage, r is the rental rate for capital, k is this period's capital stock, M is nominal money holdings, X is a cash transfer from the government, P is the price of all of the consumption goods and capital, q is the relative price of transactions services, T is the quantity of financial services bought, and a prime denotes the values of variables next period. The transactions services 6. The latter assumption is not simply a normalization. It has the plausible implication that consumption of good 1 is finite, but this means that sufficiently low positive nominal interest rates will eliminate the inefficient use of transactions services. See the discussion on this point at the end of Section II. constraints require that a good either be purchased with cash, or with a transactions service costing q, as discussed above, Assuming that that equation 3 holds with equality, the firstorder-conditionsfor an interior solution to this problem are the three constraints and:
where~and p are the multipliers on (2) and (3) 
Eliminating c .* * and p from the the condition for j yields, q=cj${filf~+i)y-1} To interpret this equation, note that the product of the terms in brackets on the right hand side is less than i (for small values of i it is approximately equal to i). The cost of purchasing an amount q/i of a consumption good using cash exactly equals the cost of purchasing it with a transactions service. Thus C .* J+ is just larger than this level. Similarly, one can show that c .* is just below this level.
J-

*
Thus j is, roughly speaking, the index of the good that is consumed at a level equalizing the two types of transactions costs. For goods with j>j' it is cheaper to use transactions services, while for goods * with j<j it is cheaper to use cash.
The growth rate of consumption of good 1 can be derived from the condition for k' : 8
Equations (2)- (7) determine the optimal time paths for k, M, cl' Cj (j#l), j*, and~, given time paths for r, w, q, n, and X/P plUS initial holdings of real money balances and capital.
8. Note that the assumption of an interior solution for j* implies that good one is purchased with transactions services. If this were not the case, then the economy would look like a simple cash-inadvance model.
c. The Firms' Problems
The firms in each sector maximize profits given the levels of -13-wages and prices. All consumption-goodsproducers have identical production functions, eF(kj,lj), as do capital-goods producers.
The first order conditions for producers of consumption goods are:
is the capital-labor ratio chosen by the firm. The first order conditions for capital-producingfirms are the same:
where 'k = kk/lk Since consumption and capital producers have the same production functions and face identical factor prices, their prices will be the same, as was assumed above.
Firms producing transactions services have a production function e(l/~)F(kz,lz),for some fixed~. Note that the production function differs from that of the goods producing sectors only by a constant. As a result, shifts in the size of the transaction-services sector have no effect on the relative returns to capital and labor. This is a convenient simplification. In addition, production of transactions services is assumed not to require the use of money.
There is little effect on the results of the model if transaction services production does require money--as in Fischer (1983)--solong as the share of money in production is small. One measure of that share would be the interest lost on bank holdings of (interest free) reserves as a fraction of GDP in the banking sector. Since total bank reserves (includingvault cash) are only about $60 billion and shortterm nominal interest rates are currently under 5-1/2 percent, the foregone interest amounts to roughly $3-1/2 billion a year, or less than two percent of banking sector GDP.
Given the assumed production function, the first order conditions for a transactions sector firm are:
where Notice that (8)-(9") imply that:
(lo) q=g
The government has a simple policy of increasing the money supply by a constant fraction, a, each period. Hence:
As noted above, these increases in the money supply are achieved via markets for each of the consumption goods, money, transactions services, capital, and labor clear.
Market clearing in the consumption goods markets is:
(13) = eljf(K) for all j Cj Market clearing in the transactions sector is given by: (14) l-j* = 6(1/~)l~f(K)
Market clearing in the money market is:
Market clearing in the rental market for capital is:
and market clearing in the purchase market for capital is:
Market clearing in the labor market is:
Because of Walras' law, one of the market clearing conditions will be redundant.
F. Steady-state Conditions
In the steady state equations (2)- (7), (8)- (12), and (13) 
which shows that total output must be equal to total consumption of the various consumption goods plus purchases of financial services.
In steady state, the relative consumption of the various goods can be obtained from equations 5a and 5b:
'22a)'j={(l+3);l+a,}1'y~(j):l 'orjsj* and (22b) '. CJ =~(j)=1 for j > j* * The steady state condition for j is given by:
Cj+ v } ((1+5) (1+0) )~-1 =T
he steady-state levels of~~and~* are jointly determined by (21) and (23), after substituting for the c .'s using (22a) and (22b). Then J the steady-state levels of the c . J 's can be obtained from (22a) and (22b).
Finally, the level of the steady-state real money stock is given by:
II. Graphical Analysis Using (23) as:
equations (22a) and (22b), one can rewrite (21) and defines a locus in c 1-j* space that is feasible given K and~. This locus is upward-sloping because an increase in j* reduces the production of transactions services and so allows an increase in c1" I call this locus BB ; it is shown in Figure 2 . Equation (23') also defines a locus in c 1-j* space along which the marginal cost of *th purchasing the j good with cash is balanced against the cost of an additional financial service, for each value of c
1"
This locus is downward sloping because an increase in c1 raises the amount of each good purchased and so raises the cost of purchasing each good--including the j 'th good--with cash. Thus the marginal condition is * satisfied at a lower j . This locus is also shown in Figure 2 , and it is labeled FF. The intersection of these two loci provides the * steady-state values of c~and j .
It is useful to define a third locus. Equation (24) can be rewritten as:
'24')'n=c,{(l+b,;l+a)l''y r~(j)dj Equation (24') defines a locus along which the steady-state level of real money balances are constant. This locus is downward sloping since an increase in c~would raise money holdings unless fewer goods were purchased with cash. In general, this line can be either steeper or flatter than than FF; it is labeled MM in Figure 2 . Steady-state real money balances are higher above and to the right of MM.
This figure can be used to explore the effect on the steady state of this economy of changes in the technology and government policy parameters.
A. The Effect of an increase in 0 An increase in productivity in all industries, e, raises output, thereby shifting the BB line up. It has no effect on the other curves. As a result, c1 rises and j* falls (see Figure 3) . Not surprisingly, increased productivity raises consumption. It also increases the use of financial services because more goods are consumed in large enough quantities to make purchasing them with financial services preferable to paying the inflation tax. Note that if the MM locus is steeper than the FF locus, then real money balances decline. In fact, as long as O(O) is strictly positive, a large enough increase in e will make this economy cashless, since consumption of good O will eventually be sufficientlyhigh than it will be optimal to purchase it with transactions services. * Nonetheless, if~(j) is steep at j , then there would be little substitution of transactions services for cash transactions owing to a rise in e, and the steady-state level of real balances would rise since the increased consumption of goods purchased with cash would outweigh the small reduction in the number of goods purchased with cash.
B. The Effect of a Decrease inÃ n improvement in the transactions technology (which is a decline in~) shifts the BB line up since for a fixed j*, fewer resources need to be employed in the financial services sector. The fall in { also shifts the FF line to the left because at the margin it is now cheaper to transact with financial services, thereby reducing j* for each cl. Thus the decrease in~causes a fall in j*--i.e. a larger financial sector--and could cause a rise or fall in c1 (see Figure 4) . The change in & has no effect on the MM line, and so the steady state money stock likely falls.
If the shift in the FF locus is large enough, then the improvement in the transactions technology could reduce welfare. This result is not as surprising as it may seem. If~is very large, then no financial services are used. In this case, the economy is super-9 neutral, and the steady-state outcome is first best.
It is also the same steady-state outcome that would occur with { equal to zero--i.e., free financial services and no money holding. For~between the two extremes, the dead-weight cost of using the transactions services sector reduces welfare, and the effect on welfare of a change in & is ambiguous.
Indeed, the government in this model could raise welfare by eliminating the financial sector through regulation. Of course attempting to do so in a real economy would lead to the substitution of home-produced financial services or a foreign currency for financial services produced by the domestic financial services sector, with a likely loss in efficiency.
9. This outcome would not be first best if inflation affected the labor supply and savings decisions. See Gillman (1993) and Aiyagri et al. (1995) for discussions. The cost of higher inflation has two components in this model. The first, familiar from Lucas and Stokey (1987) , is the distortion in the distribution of consumption across goods purchased with cash and those purchased with credit (see Figure 6 ). In this model, however, which goods fall into each category is endogenous.
The cost of this distortion is likely small for low rates of inflation since the lower consumption of goods purchased with cash is partially compensated by increased consumption of goods purchased with transactions services. The second cost is the waste of resources resulting from the use of transactions services rather than money.
This loss could be large because the resources shifted to the production of transactions services are completely lost.
The optimal monetary policy in this economy is clearly to set sufficiently low that all purchases are made with cash. If~(j) is bounded, as assumed above, this policy will not correspond to a zero nominal interest rate, as in the Friedman rule. So long as the nominal interest rate is low enough that it is cheaper to buy good 1 with cash than with purchased transactions services, there will be no cost to the inflation. If one allowed~(j) to go to infinity as j goes to 1, then the usual Friedman rule would obtain. 10
III. Empirical Evidence
In the Introduction, I noted the evidence from the 1920s on the effect of hyperinflation on the size of the financial sector. A similar effect has been noted in the cases of Brazil and Israel in the 1980s. Dornbusch et al. (1990, p. 25) note that in Brazil "financial markets substantiallyadapted [to high inflation]. As a result, the velocity of Ml rose more than in other countries, while that of M 4 increased less. The sharp rise in the velocity of Ml reflects a well organized payment system by check (even for a lunch snack) drawn on overnight accounts.~Presumably this "well-organized"payment system required increased capital and labor in the financial sector. Marom (1988) , presents an empirical study of the effects of inflation on the size of the banking sector in Israel in the early 1980s. He notes that while the share of banking in Israeli GDP in 1970 was smaller than in any of the six OECD countries for which 10. The Friedman rule would also obtain, regardless of the boundedness of~, if inflation affected the labor or savings decisions. Aiyagari et al. (1995) and Cooley and Hansen (1991) argue that these distortions could be important. clear, however, whether the proportional increase in the financial sector will be larger or smaller than that of GDP. Similarly, more transactions will be done with financial services if the financial 11. The resulting difference in the method of domestic payments is noted in a recent Economist survey of Latin American Finance (Dec. 9-15, 1995) . Kamin and Ericsson (1993) present an empirical study of dollarization in Argentina. They conclude that holdings of U.S. dollar currency in Argentina were nearly as large as the total of dollar-denominateddomestic deposits and all peso-denominatedmonetary assets by the early 1990s. They also note that the effect of inflation on the use of dollars appears to be long lived. sector becomes more efficient, but the relative price of these services will fall. Thus, the net effect of the productivity increase on the financial sector's share is uncertain.
Because of the difficulty of obtaining comparable information on the relative size of the banking sector for a large number of countries, I focus on the broader sector including finance, insurance, and real estate. I use two measures of the size of the financial sector: its share in GDP and its share in employment (both in percent). These shares can be used to calculate the relative productivity of labor in the financial sector. Because data on capital inputs are not available, a more comprehensivemeasure of total factor productivity cannot be constructed. The GDP, employment, and labor productivity data are for 1985.12 Wherever possible, I measure annual average percentage inflation using the GDP deflator.
Where this is not available, the consumer price index has been substituted. Because the model presented above focused on steady states, I use the average annual inflation rate over the ten years from 1975 to 1985.13 To account for differences in the level of income across countries, I use GNP per capita at world prices from the Penn World Table (Summers and Heston, 1991) . For details on the data used, see the data appendix.
B. Empirical Results
The first column of table 1 shows the results of a regression of the share of the financial sector in GDP on per-capita real output, average inflation over the previous 10 years, and relative labor 12. In some cases the employment data were not available for 1985, and so data from 1984, 1986, or 1987 were substituted. 13. I experimentedwith the average inflation rate over 1980-85 and obtained similar results. The use of the interaction term improves the fit of the regression fairly substantially,suggesting that the effect of inflation on the size of the financial sector is smaller for lowincome than for high-income countries.
The results of an alternative test are shown in table 2.
Here the countries are divided into three groups based on income per capita, and for each group a separate regression is run of financial 15 sector size on income and average inflation.
The coefficient on the inflation rate is small and insignificantfor the poorest countries, moderate and marginally significant for the middle-income countries, and large and significant for the high-income countries.
The theoretical model suggests that the effect of inflation on financial sector size should be nonlinear. In particular, if inflation gets sufficientlyhigh, virtually all transactions are done without money. Further increases in inflation will then have no effect on the size of the financial sector. Experimentationwith a number of nonlinear specifications,however, did not yield statistically significant nonlinearities.
The remaining columns in table 1 show regression results for the share of the financial sector in total employment. One difference between the GDP share and employment share results is the significance of the productivity variable in the employment regressions, especially 14. If the level of inflation is included as well as the interaction term, it is insignificant and does not affect the other parameters.
15. The income categories were defined, arbitrarily, as under $2000, between $2000 and $9000, and over $9000. The mean income level in the sample is about $4800. Modest changes in the cutoff levels of income do not affect the results appreciably so long as Israel (with a 1985 per capita income of $9293) remains in the high income group. when it is interacted with the level of income (column 5). Given the insignificance of this variable in the GDP regression, the significancehere may not be a surprise. Since countries with higher financial sector labor productivity do not generally have a larger share of GDP in the financial sector, they must have a smaller share of employment in the sector. The inflation interaction term is significant in the employment regressions, although the coefficient is less than 1/3 the size of the comparable term in the GDP regressions.
The smaller parameter is not surprising because, on average, the share of the financial sector in employment is about 1/3 as large as its share in GDP, suggesting a similar proportional decline in the size of the parameter.
C. Caveats
There are two caveats to the empirical results shown above. (FinancialSector GDP)/(Total GDP) (FinancialSector Employment) /(Total Employment) which is the ratio of the financial sector share in GDP to the financial sector share in employment.
17. To do the adjustment, I started by adjusting the relative productivity variable by evaluating the two inflation terms in the regression and subtracting them from the relative productivity measure. Then I multiplied this adjusted productivitymeasure by the share of the financial sector in employment to get the adjusted measure of the financial sector in GDP. the figure. 18 If they are excluded from the regressions, the inflation terms are no longer significant. However, excluding them is surely wrong, since high inflation countries are exactly the ones with the most information about the effects of inflation on financial sector size.
Nonetheless. it is unfortunate that the effect of inflation on financial sector size does not stand out in the lower inflation countries. Evidently, other factors contribute importantly to variation in the size of countries' financial sectors. In part, this variation likely reflects the effects of regulation and past financial sector difficulties. In addition, the regressions employ data on the production of financial services, while it is consumption of financial services that should be affected by inflation. Clearly, if a country purchases financial services from firms in a neighboring country, its financial sector will appear to be unexpectedly small, while that of its neighbor will appear to be large. The geographical pattern of the residuals suggests that this difference may be significant in some cases. For example, the residual for Belgium in the regression shown in column 3 of table 1 is -8.3 percent, the financial sector in Luxembourg is more than 9 percent larger than the equation would lead you to expect (because of its small population, Luxembourg was excluded from the regression). By contrast, the standard error of the regression is only 3.6 percent. Similarly, the residual for Ireland is -5.8 percent, while that for the United Kingdom is +3.6.
In some cases there appear to be regional financial centers reflecting relative political or economic stability. In particular, Jordan and Kenya have unexpectedly large financial sectors (residualsof 6.2 and 18. The other one is Chile, which had the seventh highest inflation rate in the sample. 6.0 percent respectively) , while some of their neighbors have unexpectedly small ones. Note that to the extent that low inflation allows a country to export financial services to its neighbors, low rather than high inflation would be associated with a large financial sector, biasing downward the estimated effect of inflation on the size of the financial sector.
D. Discussion
The regressions shown in table 1 suggest a larger cost of inflation than might have been expected. A 10 percent rise in the inflation rate in the U.S. (1985 real per-capita income, $16,779) would be expected to increase the share of the financial sector in GDP by about 1-1/2 percent, and its share in employment by about 1/2 percent. The 1-1/2 percent share of GDP is a measure of the resources lost owing to the inflation. Fischer (1981) and Lucas (1981) calculate that the welfare loss of a 10 percent inflation amounts to .3 to .45 percent of GNP, based on estimates of the area under a money demand curve. However, Lucas (1994) To assess whether the large costs of inflation found here are credible, table 5 presents information on the two measures of financial sector size, inflation, and per-capita income for the five 19. The two are exactly equal if inflation is not allowed to distort the pattern of consumption across goods. For a proof of a similar result, see Aiyagari et al. (1995) . The same appears to have been the case in Bolivia (Melvin, 1988; Melvin and Afcha, 1989) and Peru (Rojas-Suarez,1992) . The experience in these countries suggests that high inflation may not lead to as large an expansion in the financial sector if currency substitution takes place instead. Which method of adjustment predominates presumably depends on the regulatory environment as well as the quality of financial firms at the start of the inflation. In any case, the likely importance of dollarization in limiting the size of the financial sector in some of the high inflation countries suggests that the regression results reported above will provide underestimates of the effects of inflation on financial sector size for countries where growth in the financial sector is not constrained by regulation or financial crises.
The evident large effects of inflation shown in table 3 are consistent with the large costs of modest inflations implied by the regressions. For example, Israel, with 110 percentage points of "extra" inflation relative to its peers, had a financial sector share about 11 percentage points higher, implying a cost of about 1 percent of GDP for each 10 percent of inflation. For the U.S., with per capita income about half again as large, an increase of 1-1/2 percent for a 10 percent inflation seems plausible. Aiyagari et al. (1995) report that the effects of inflation on the banking sector appear to be limited to a few percent of GDP.
Thus the larger effects found here for the broader finance, insurance, and real estate sector likely reflect, in part, increases in other subsectors as well as in banking. This implication seems plausible:
other intermediaries , such as insurance companies and securities dealers will have to handle more transactions as businesses and households increase their efforts to conserve on cash. Moreover, such firms will also be boosting their own efforts to limit cash holdings.
Of course institutional inertia or nonlinearities could limit the expansion of the financial sector in response to moderate inflations, reducing the cost of such inflations to levels below those implied by the estimated equations. There are other reasons, however, to believe that the increase in the size of the financial sector understates the total costs of inflation. For example, this measure does not take account of the unremunerated costs of increased "home production" of financial services--e.g.the traditional shoeleather costs of inflation--nor does it account for the production of financial services by nonfinancial firms. Bresciani-Turroni (1937) notes that during the German hyperinflation nonfinancial firms had to greatly increase the amount of "unproductive"work time--i.e., work required to manage financial flows.
The increase in the size of the financial sector also does not take account of a variety of other inflation-relateddistortions.
For example, the wedge driven between the marginal utility of cash and non-cash goods in consumption reduces welfare directly. Similar distortions in labor supply and investment decisions reduce welfare indirectly by reducing either current or future output. Even if consumption and investment would otherwise not be affected, if reserves pay no interest, inflation serves as a tax on intermediation, reducing the efficiency of resource allocation. Finally, there is some evidence (see Fischer, 1993 ) that inflation reduces the growth rate of total factor productivity, which would have a potentially large effect on welfare.
Data Appendix
The data on the size of the financial sector are taken from two United Nations sources. The data on GDP by sector are from the United Nations National Accounts: Main A~~re~ates and Detailed Tables  volumes (table 1. 11) . The data for 1985 were not available for every country in the 1986 volume, and so later volumes were used in some cases. The employment data by sector are from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook. Because of lags in data availability, several volumes from the late 1980s were used. The numbering of the tables in the yearbooks changes from year to year. As noted in the text, employment data for 1985 were not always available, and data for 1984, 1986, or 1987 have been substitutedwhere necessary. These data are used to calculate the shares of the finance, insurance, and real estate sector in GDP and employment, and relative labor productivity in that sector.
The inflation data is taken from the country tables in the InternationalMonetary Fund's InternationalFinancial Statistics volume (1992) . Where possible the GDP deflator (line 99bi) is used, Where this is not reported, consumer price index data (line 64) have been substituted. For a few high inflation countries, the deflator grew by so much that it cannot be reported in the country tables. In these cases, the inflation rates, as reported in the inflation tables (pp. 152-155 for the deflator, pp. 104-107 for the cpi) have been used instead.
The per capita income at world prices data is from the Penn World Table (Summers and Heston, 1991) . Robert Summers kindly provided this data on diskette.
I exclude countries with populations below three million. These countries are very noisy since some are offshore or regional banking centers (e.g. Panama, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, and Singapore) while others are not.
The data used in the regressions is available from the author on request. Descriptive statistics are shown below: the share of the financial sector in Bolivian employment was 0.9 percent in 1987, the year closest to 1985 for which data are available. This is lower than all but three countries in the sample, and implies a very unlikely level of relative productivity in the sector. I have assumed that the number is an error and excluded it from the regressions. Including it does not greatly affect the results presented in the last two columns in table 1. In particular, the effect of inflation is still statisticallysignificant. 
